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HUMANE SOCIETY: GOOD GUYS OR GESTAPO?
R. DAVID DlJULIO, DiJulio & King, A Law Corporation, 420 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 601, Glendale,
California 91203-2300.
ABSTRACT: Humane Societies and Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals perform important functions
for the state, the counties, the community, and the public in protecting animal rights and enforcing state animal laws.
Their staffs are hardworking and well meaning, but are not trained in police work. As the Societies have the right to
conduct searches, seize property, make arrests, and use deadly force, they are required by the Constitution to perform
such functions only after they have shown probable cause to a neutral party and obtained a warrant. Their failure to
obtain warrants before performing such intrusive functions violates trappers' and homeowners' civil rights which subjects
the Societies to suits for damages. To truly protect the public and to protect their budgets, the Societies should train
their staff in civil rights and procedures. The Societies have the powers of the police, but resist following the laws and
rules that apply to the exercise of police powers. In their zeal to protect animals, they have invaded people's property,
even their nouses, confiscated traps and released animals—all without warrants or other review of their actions. These
actions have led to the question of whether the Societies are "Good Guys or the Gestapo?"
KEY WORDS: Humane Societies, Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, civil rights, police powers,
constitution, Fourth Amendment, due process, lawsuits, damages, searches and seizures, arrests, trappers
Proc. 18th Vertebr. Pest Conf. (R.O. Baker & A.C. Crabb,
Eds.) Published at Univ. of Calif., Davis. 1998.
HUMANE SOCIETIES HAVE STATE POLICE
POWERS
Societies are private organizations that have no
inherent power, but derive all their powers and authority
to enforce animal laws from the State. As in most states,
in California, the counties can chose to operate their own
animal control services or to hire the Society to perform
animals control services for the county.
Officers of Societies ("Humane Officers") are given
powers of a policeman to enforce the animals laws and to
arrest people who violate the laws. California Law (Civil
Code § 607) states that a Humane Officer is not a peace
officer, but may exercise the powers of a peace officer at
all places within the state in order to prevent the
perpetration of any act of cruelty upon any animal. To
that end, a Humane Officer may summon to his or her
aid any bystander. A Humane Officer may make arrests
for the violation of any penal law of this state relating to
or affecting animals in the same manner as any peace
officer.
A Humane Officer may also serve search
warrants and is authorized to carry firearms while
exercising the duties of a Humane Officer. A Humane
Officer may even use reasonable force, and deadly force,
to prevent the perpetration of any act of cruelty upon any
animal (Civil Code § 607).

INTRODUCTION
The Humane Society is a private organization that
has been given significant powers by the state to prevent
and to enforce the state law concerning cruelty to animals.
The Humane Societies see themselves as animal protection
organizations to foster respect, understanding, and
compassion for all creatures.
In many California
counties, the Humane Societies or Societies for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which are referred
jointly to as "Society" for the balance of this paper, fulfill
the functions of the animal control officer under contract
to the county.
The thesis of this paper is that while the Societies see
themselves as compassionate, caring "good guys," they
lack respect and understanding of basic rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and the California Constitution. There is no doubt that
the Societies mean well and do important work in the area
of animal control; however, no matter how much good
work they do, it cannot justify their violations of the civil
rights of trappers and their customers. The right of a
citizen to be secure in his or her home is one of the most
fundamental rights protected by the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This right, which
includes the right to not be subjected to warrantless
searches and seizures and to not be subjected to
warrantless arrests, is routinely violated by the Society
and its compassionate and well-meaning, but overzealous,
staff who trample onto private property, invade homes,
seize traps, and arrest people—all without warrants. In
some of cases the author has seen, the Society staff have
acted like storm troopers trampling the rights of citizens
in their efforts to protect animals, giving rise to the
question, "Is the Humane Society a Good Guy or
Gestapo?"

FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS LIMIT
THE SOCIETIES POWERS AND METHODS; THEY
HAVE TO GET SEARCH WARRANTS AND GIVE
MIRANDA WARNINGS JUST LIKE THE POLICE DO
While ordinarily one does not think of the Humane
Society, animal control staff, or the "dog catcher" as
subject to civil rights laws, they are because they are
acting under the "color of state law" with the powers to
seize property, search, and make arrests. Just as police
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powers are limited in the manner and procedures used to
collect evidence, conduct searches, make seizures, and
effectuate arrests, when Societies are fulfilling police-like
functions, they are governed by the same civil rights
laws, rules, and procedures.
To understand the
limitations that the civil rights laws put on the Societies,
a review of the civil rights laws is necessary.
The Federal Civil Rights Statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983,
"Section 1983") states:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other persons within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 has two essential elements: "[1] the conduct
complained of must have been committed by a person
acting under color of state law; and [2] must result in a
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States" (Bendiburg
v. Dempsev 1990). Each of these elements will be
discussed in the following sections.
THE SOCIETIES ACT UNDER COLOR OF STATE
LAW
By delegating significant state power to the Societies,
including the right to enforce laws, serve warrants, and
make arrests, the state effectively deputized the Societies,
rendering them state actors under Section 1983. "Actions
of private individuals performing state functions are
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment" (Amalgamated
Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza 1968).
The Societies perform the state function of enforcing
animal control laws pursuant to a state law, and the state
has granted Society officers with peace officer authority
to arrest, wear uniforms and badges, carry guns, and use
deadly force. Clearly, the Societies are operating under
the color of state law.
The situation is no different than if a city contracted
with a private firm to provide a police force. No one
would argue that a city police officer who worked for a
private company under contract to a city, instead of
directly for the city, would be able to search without
warrants, arrest without probable cause, or interrogate in
back rooms with a rubber hose, all without judicial
controls. The same reasoning applies to the Societies:
their "private" status does not exempt them from civil
rights laws when they are performing governmental
functions.
The California courts have routinely held that
Societies' actions are state action under the civil rights
laws. In a recent case, the court said: "This appeal
presents the question of whether animal control officers
can lawfully enter a home, absent a warrant or consent,
to seize and impound a homeowner's dog for a violation
of the leash law. We hold that the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution precludes such conduct."
(Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society 1996).

SEARCHES, SEIZURES OF TRAPS, AND ARRESTS
BY THE SOCIETIES MAY VIOLATE CITIZEN'S
CIVIL RIGHTS
Since the Societies are operating under the color of
state law, the Constitutional Bill of Rights applies to their
actions, which means if they violate the rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, they are liable under the civil rights laws.
The question is then, "What types of activities may give
rise to a violation of rights?"
Warrantless Searches
Humane Officers routinely enter backyards to
investigate hurt or sick animals, and to release animals
from traps. Such entries are almost always done without
warrants or without permission from the homeowner.
California law has held that absent prior permission,
Societies cannot conduct a warrantless search and seizure.
In Pasadena, a Society officer was chasing an injured dog
and the dog ran into a house through the dog door. The
officer was concerned about the dog, so he tried the door
and when he found it unlocked, he went into the
house—all without a warrant. The homeowner found out
about the invasion, sued, and the court, not surprisingly,
held that the statutes upon which the Society relied did
not dispense with the Fourth Amendment requirement that
official entry into a home be justified by warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances. "A statute does not
trump the Constitution" (Conway v. Pasadena Humane
Society), which means the law creating the Societies can
not give them any more power than the Constitution
allows.
Warrantless Seizures
Societies seize traps when they believe that they are
either illegal traps, improperly marked, or contain
distressed animals. These seizures are routinely done
without warrants and without prior notice to the trapper.
In one case with which the author's firm was involved,
the Society was in a dispute with a trapper over tagging
of his traps. On numerous occasions, the Society seized
his traps and released the animals. The Society claimed
that it seized the traps because they were unidentified, but
when the trapper demanded the return of the traps, the
Society argued that all of his traps were returned. Asked
the simple question, "If you seized the traps because you
could not tell who they belonged to, how did you know
they were returned?"—they had no answers. In fact, if
the traps were seized because they were unmarked, how
could the Society have returned any of them? The real
problem is that the seizure of the trapper's property
without notice or a warrant is a clear violation of the
Fourth Amendment prohibitions against warrantless
seizures.
Releases
Societies believe that they have a duty to release
animals from any trap, legal or illegal, if the animal is
suffering, a definition which includes wet animals. (Does
a wet raccoon fair better in the rain than when it is in a
trap?) To perform a release, the Humane Officer must
conduct a search of the homeowner's property, then
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imminent danger to life and limb, such as where the
police were investigating a conspiracy to kill a
presidential candidate such as Robert Kennedy (People v.
Sirhan 1972), to prevent serious damage to property
(People v. Remiro 1979), or where the police were at the
door and heard moaning sounds as if a person were in
distress (People v. Roberts 1956). Exigent circumstances
also include hot pursuit of a fleeing felon (People v.
Escudero 1979), but there are no cases which allow
warrantless searches for fleeing, or even suffering,
animals.
In a feeble attempt to justify its warrantless searches
under an exigent circumstances exception, one Society
tried to justify its warrantless searches by claiming that
traps were close to the public sidewalk creating an
imminent danger to small children and other passersby.
The court rejected that argument not only because the
emergency did not rise to the "exigent circumstances"
level, but because it is not the Societies' responsibility to
protect passersby from traps. This example shows the
Societies' tendencies to operate outside of the law,
perhaps out of frustration at the lack of action by the
police, who have to get warrants and comply with civil
rights laws.

seize, at least temporarily, the trapper's property (the
trap), and then release what is arguably the trapper's
property, the animal. The loss of the animal adversely
affects the trapper's business because he or she does not
get paid, which means a property right is involved. The
releases, if done without a warrant, violate trappers'
rights.
THE EXCEPTIONS TO WARRANT REQUIREMENTS
DO NOT APPLY IN SOCIETY FUNCTIONS SO THEY
NEED TO GET WARRANTS OR PERMISSION IN
ALL CASES
Probable Cause Is Not an Excuse for Not Getting a
Warrant
Often the Societies' initial justification for warrantless
searches is "probable cause," which demonstrates that the
Societies are clueless regarding the Fourth Amendment
and violations of civil rights. In one case, the Society
justified its warrantless searches as follows: "In each
case, because the officers had reason to believe that
criminality may be afoot, they were justified in entering
onto the property in question to investigate the complaints
they received."
The problem with this justification is that probable
cause is not a justification for a warrantless search; it is
a necessary ingredient to obtaining a warrant. "Reasonable
or probable cause to suspect or believe that contraband is
present or that a crime is being committed or attempted
must exist to justify a search pursuant to a search
warrant" (Shvev v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County 1973).
The Societies' standard for warrantless searches as
stated above does not even meet the test for probable
cause for obtaining a warrant, which is "such a state of
facts as would lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person involved is guilty of the offense
charged" (People v. Kilvington 1894). A belief is not a
set of facts, because a belief is, by definition, based on
unverifiable feelings. That "criminality may be afoot"
falls far short of the requirement that the government has
a good faith belief that a crime is being committed. The
Societies' position that they can conduct warrantless
searches based on a "belief" that criminality "may be
afoot" is beyond chilling, indeed, it is scary. Think about
big brother busting into your house anytime it says it
"believes that criminality may be afoot."

The Plain View Exception Is Not an Excuse for Illegally
Entering Onto Property; It Applies Only to What is
Really in Plain View
"Plain view" is an exception to the Fourth
Amendment which has four elements. If the police:
1) are legitimately on the property; 2) discover evidence;
3) see such evidence in plain view; and 4) have cause to
believe the item is evidence of a crime, then they may
seize the evidence without first obtaining a warrant.
In one case, the Humane Officer was told by the
homeowner that he was trespassing and ordered him off
the property. The officer left, but came back an hour
later, decided that the fact the homeowner was not at
home justified his entry onto the property, even though it
was contrary to the homeowner's express instructions an
hour before. In his zeal to release the raccoon, he
trespassed on the property without a warrant. To
compound the initial illegal entry, he repeated this action
an hour later and released another raccoon. In another
incident, the Humane Officers left a message on the
homeowners' answering machine advising them that the
Society had reports of suffering animals, so they entered
the property and confiscated traps and released animals.
In both incidents, the Society justified its warrantless
search based on the plain view doctrine. As none of the
officers had the consent of the homeowners to be on the
property, the Humane Officers were not legitimately on
the premises, and the first leg of the plain view doctrine
is not met.
It is the author's view that the second leg of the plain
view doctrine is rarely met because in most of the traprelated incidents, the evidence is not in plain view. The
plain view exception allows police officers to observe
things only in plain sight which means open and visible to
the naked eye (People v. Nichols 1970). The plain sight
test does not extend to situations where something was
easily reached though it was out of sight. For instance,
it is not a legal search for a police officer to reach into a

Wet Or Even Suffering Animals Are Not Exigent
Circumstances
Societies also try to justify their warrantless searches
and seizures based on the "exigent circumstances"
exception, but exigent circumstances are true emergencies
such as police searches where a fire has broken out and
they have to enter before a warrant could be obtained, not
mere conveniences or concerns by Society staff. Some
Societies argue that any time an animal is being
mistreated, the Society can conduct warrantless searches
and seizures under a emergency or exigent circumstance
doctrine, but a suffering animal does not rise to the level
of emergency required to justify civil rights violations.
Warrantless searches have been recognized in
emergency situations requiring swift action to prevent
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recessed area between the bumper and the body of an
automobile even though the bumper and the car are in
plain view (People v. Conley 1971).
Many of the Society seizures were done at night,
because that is when the pests are trapped and start
screaming, prompting the neighbors to call the Society.
At night it would be virtually impossible to plainly see
that a trap is illegal, unless it was an obvious leghold or
similar trap. In the case being discussed here, the Society
was seizing the traps because under the theory they
believed the traps were not properly tagged. It was
successfully argued that at night it would be impossible
for the Humane Officers to determine whether the traps
contained the correct tag, or even if they contained a tag
at all, without a search, which was above and beyond
what the officers could see in plain view. Similar
arguments apply to traps under houses.
The most important aspect of the plain view exception
is that the government cannot stand it on its head, and use
the fact that they saw something illegal as the basis to
invade the property. They have to be legally on the
property before the plain view doctrine can be considered.
For example, if the homeowner gives permission to
search and then the Humane Officers see an illegal trap,
that would be under the exception.

contrary to good sense. A trapper's customers hire him
to trap and dispose of animals, and, to do so, he must
maintain control of the traps. A trapper is obligated by
the law to protect the animals in the traps from the
elements and to ensure that they have water and food so
they do not suffer. Lastly, his clients pay him to take the
animals away and dispose of them, and the law requires
him to dispose of them in a humane manner. To comply
with these rules, a trapper must maintain control of his
traps. After all, a trapper is not running a trap leasing
service; he is operating a pest control service.
A Temporary Taking Even for One Day or Only One
Hour is Still a Taking
Apparently under the theory that a small violation of
civil rights does not count, Societies argue that since the
seizures are temporary, there are no violations of the
Fourth Amendment. In a case against an animal control
officer for return of farm animals which had been seized
and impounded for running "at large," the court said that:
"Moreover, the fact that the deprivation may be
temporary does not alter the need for due process"
(Carrera v. Bertaini 1976). Even a temporary taking of
property without proper procedures is a violation of civil
rights.
TAKING TRAPS WITHOUT A PRE-SEIZURE
HEARING IS A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION
The United States Constitution guarantees every
person "procedural due process," which means that the
government must provide notice and an opportunity to be
heard to a person before depriving a person of a property
interest. The California Supreme Court has also noted
that "the Constitution generally requires that an individual
be accorded notice and some form of hearing before he is
deprived of a protective or liberty interest" (Kash
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles 1977). In
Beaudreau v. Superior Court (1975), the court again
emphasized a need for a hearing before a state actor takes
another's property:
We start with the basic proposition that in every
case involving a deprivation of property within
the purview of the due process clause, the
Constitution requires some form of hearing.
Absent extraordinary circumstances justifying
resort to summary procedures, this hearing must
take place before an individual is deprived of a
significant property interest.

Just Because Traps Are in the Open Does Not Mean
There Is No Expectation of Privacy
Another theory advanced by the Societies is that no
warrant is needed to enter onto private property to seize
traps because they are in open fields. If the traps were
placed in a field or other area where there would be no
expectation of privacy, then the police, a Society, or a
passerby could seize them without a warrant, because the
trapper had surrendered his rights in the traps. However,
traps are not placed in open fields because no one cares
about pests in open fields; homeowners and business
owners hire trappers. Traps are placed on customers'
property adjacent to their houses, or under houses,
because that is where the pests live. Whether the traps
are under the house, adjacent to the house, or scattered
throughout the backyard, clearly they are within the
protected zone of privacy, which in England 500 years
ago was referred to as the curtilage of the house.
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which
extends the intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a person's home and the privacies of life;
the protection afforded the curtilage under the Fourth
Amendment is essentially a protection of the families
and the personal privacy of an area immediately
linked to the home both physically and
psychologically where the privacy expectations of
most heightened . . . (California v. Ciraolo 1986).
No one would argue that the police could conduct a
warrantless search and seizure in a backyard because the
owner had no expectation of privacy, but Societies
routinely make this argument to justify their trespasses.

The Societies fail to give trappers notice and an
opportunity to be heard before they seize traps; thus, they
deprive trappers of procedural due process. The Societies
defend their clearly unconstitutional activities under the
theory that Humane Officers are exempt from search
and seizure laws and that Humane Officers are given
privileges not even held by the police. The due process
violation is obvious and patent.

Homeowners Cannot Give Permission to Seize Traps
To justify their actions, some Societies have argued
that the trappers lend the traps to their customers;
therefore, trappers have no right of privacy or reason to
object to the taking by the Societies. This argument is

SUMMARY
Societies perform important functions for the State,
the counties, the community, and the public. Their staffs
are hardworking and well meaning, but are not trained in
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police work. As the Societies perform police functions of
conducting searches, seizing property, making arrests, and
using deadly force, they are required by the Constitution
to perform such functions only after they have shown
probable cause to a neutral party and obtained a warrant.
Their failure to obtain warrants before performing
such intrusive functions, violates the trappers' and
homeowners' civil rights, which subjects the Society to
suits for damages. To truly protect the public and to
protect their budgets, the Societies should train their staff
in civil rights and procedures.
The Societies have the powers of the police, but resist
following the laws and rules that apply to the exercise of
police powers. In their zeal to protect animals, they have
invaded people's property, even their houses, confiscated
traps, and released animals—all without warrants or other
review of their actions. Unless the Societies reform their
methods and comply with the Fourth Amendment, they
are going to be known as the Animal Control Gestapo.
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